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AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ELEVENTH 
AMENDMENT. . 
A state administrative commission has taken prop-
erty from a contractor under color of a contract with-
out due process of law. The contractor's property has 
been merged into a state structure so tqat it is impos-
sible to recover the identical property. The commis-
sion has under its control and i:;ubject to its order 
funds appropriated by the legislature to meet such 
claims as the contractor presents. It ignores his de-
. mands for payment. Thereupon he brings an action 
· against theµi in their official capacities for equitable 
relief. The attorney general of the state appears and 
·sets up the Eleventh Amendment. Who should pre-
Vail? . 
T HE American Constitution may be compared to an organism with ~ high nervous development that enables it to adapt 
itself to changes. in its env'ironment or even to new environ-
ments. As such an organism is the result of evolution, so is our 
Federal Constitution the product of centuries of human experi-
ence in the science of government. Probably most of the great 
political philosophers of all ages have donated their mite to the 
finished product. To MONTESQUIEU we owe in part, at least, our 
constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. 
The division by the Constitutional Fathers of the exercise of 
governmental powers among the several departments of the govern-
ment, and especially between State and Nation, made difficult the 
problem of the location in the American state of that indivisible 
sovereignty necessary in every state. The Federal Government 
does not possess it, for the doctrine of split or delegated powers is 
clearly sound. A great civil war and organized force decided that 
the local unit or individual State was not sovereign; that no State 
or minority of States had supreme power. 
WooDROW WILSON in his "State" describes a sovereign as "a 
determinate person, or body of persons to whom the bulk of the 
members of an organized community are in the habit of rendering 
obedience and who are themselves not in the habit of rendering 
obedience to any human superior." The separation of the powers 
of government between the different departments of American gov-
ernment makes it impossible for any one department to answer 
the requirements of political sovereignty. It may most correctly 
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be said to lodge in the American electorate, for that legal branch 
of our government possesses ultimately "a complete freedom from 
legal control of any other power whatever." It is limited in its 
exercise of supreme political powers only by the time it takes its 
selected agents to execute its mandates as revealed at each election, 
and a continued belief in their wisdom by the necessary numerical 
majority. Sovereignty in America must be said to reside in the 
·electorate, or, expressed more loosely, in the people, for Public 
Opinion or the Public Mind controls the electorate. 
In 1793 the doctrine of State Rights or State sovereignty took 
its first embarrassing form when one CHISHOI,M tried to sue the 
State of Georgia in an action of assumpsit. An immunity from suit 
was at once claimed on the grotind of sovereignty. Br,ACKSTONE in 
his COMMENTARIES expresses the doctrine of sovereignty's immunity 
from suit as follows: "The law ascnoes to the King the attnoute of 
sovereignty; he is sovereign and independent within his own do-
minions and owes no kind of subjection to any other potentate on 
earth. Hence it is that no suit or action can be brought against 
the King even in civil matters because no court can have jurisdic-
tion over him, for all jurisdiction implies superiority of power."1 
After due deliberation the United States Supreme Court decided 
the action was maintainable. The Eleventh Amendment to the 
Constitution was the answer of political America. McMAsTER in 
his "HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPI.E" reports: "Alarmed at 
the consequences of this decision both the House ar.d Senate hurried 
through the proposed Amendment without debate." The Eleventh 
Amendment may, therefore, be said to be an expression of the 
doctrine that the individual State in America is sovereign, and sov-
ereignty in America as in England is not sul>ject to judicial control. 
Many years passed and a great. civil war settled the problem of 
State sovereignty. Rule by a numerical majority of the Nation 
prevailed again~t the attempt of a minority to prevent progress. 
The results of that strife were written into law, and the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments express a different political 
theory from that expressed in the earlier Eleventh. Under the first 
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Federal Supreme Court 
has annulled acts of individual States passed under the so-called · 
sovereign powers-police, eminent domain, and taxation. 
The old Eleventh is still a part of the Constitution and the doc-
trine of State sovereignty and State immunity from· suit remain to 
trouble the constitutional lawyer. Repudiation of the doctrine of 
State sovereignty has modified ~ts original meaning _in the Constitu-
1 I Blackstone, Commentaries, 241-2. 
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tion. Judicial decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, with 
which it has clashed, have limited its jurisdiction. Each section of 
the Constitution, however, J;i.as a proper place in the whole, and it 
is, therefore, necessary to construe these two together, if possible, 
lo9king at them through fundamental principles of political theory 
and constitutional law. 
Mr. Justice SHIRAS in-Prout v. Starr,2 phrased as follows this 
axiom of coliStitutional construction when the Eleventh Amend-
ment was pleaded in an action against administrative officers: "The 
Constitution of the United States, with the several amendments 
~ereof, must be regarded as one instrument, all of whose provisions 
are to be deemed of equal validity. It would, indeed, be most un4 
fortunate if the immunity of the individual States from suits by 
citizens of other States, provided for in the Eleventh Amendment, 
w~re to be interpreted as nullifying those other provisions which 
cqnf er power on Congress to regulate commerce among the several 
States, which forbid the States from entering into any treaty, alli-
ance or confederation, from passing any bill of attainder, ex post 
~acto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or, without 
the consent of Congress, from laying any duty of tonnage, entering 
into any agreement or compact with other States or from en~ng 
in war-all of which provisions existed before the adoption of the 
Eleventh Amendment, which still exist, and which would be nullified 
and made of no effect, if the judicial power of the United States 
could not be invoked to protect citizens affected by the passage of 
Sta~e laws disregarding those constitutional limitations. Much less 
can the Eleventh Ame~dment be successfully pleaded as an in-
vincible barrier to judicial inquiry where the salutary provisions 
of the Fourteenth have been disregarded by State enactments. On 
the other hand, the judicial power of the United States has not 
infrequently been exercised in securing to the several states in 
proper cases, the immunity intended by the Eleventh Amendment." 
The apparent conflict between the two amendments, evident in 
the case that heads this article, may be eliminated by an application 
of fundamental principles of sovereignty and separation of powers, 
and each be given the proper place in an harmonious whole. A 
paragraph from Book XI of the "SPIRIT oF LAws" affords one key: 
"Again ther~ is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated 
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legisla-
tive, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbi-
trary control, for the_ judge would be then the legislator. Were it 
2 188 U. S. 53"- at p. 543· 
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joined to the executive power the judge might behave with violence 
and oppression." 
Whether an action against State officers falls within the pro-
visions of the Eleventh or Fourteenth Amendment depends upon 
the nature of the subject matter. If it involves a question in its 
nature legislative or executive, i. e. public or political, it is subject 
to the prohibition of the first; if it involves a question in its nature 
judicial, the other may be successfully invoked.. · 
The ADAMSON EIGHT HouR LA w may be used to illustrate the 
thought. In as far as it is an attempt to control hours of labor 
and meet public demands for social and economic justice, it is po-
litical and beyond the power of the courts. ·But in as far as it 
attempts by legislative decree to prescribe · an arbitrary code of 
wages, taking property from one class and giving it to another, 
without a judicial investigation of the facts it is a usurpation by 
the legislature of judicial power, a deriial of due process of law and 
unconstitutional. The nature of the law must determine the validity. 
of the court's right of nullification. 
The great .MARSHAL!, in i.v!arbury v. Madison8 expressed· this 
thought in a different application of the court's power to review 
acts of public ·officers: 
"Whether the legality of an act of the head of a department be 
examinable in a court of justice or not must always depend on the 
nature of the act." 
"The conclusion from the reasoning is, that where the heads of 
departments are the political or confidential agents of the execu-
tive, merely to execute ·the will of the President, or rather to act . 
in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal 
discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear tha,n that their acts 
are only politically ex~inable. But where a specific duty is as-
signed by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance 
of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who con-
siders himself mjured, has a right t6 resort to the laws of his 
country for a remedy." 
The right of a citizen to sue public officers must depend also 
upon the nature of his remedy. That prdblem is clearly one of 
the separation of powers. A court cannot inter£ ere with executive 
officers so long as they act within constitutional limits. It could not 
command a legislature to appropriate money to sati,sfy a judgment 
it had rendered, ·for the latter has control of the public purse. 
When a citizen sets up a proper case and the court has power 
to give relief, action against public officers in their official capacities 
• 1 Cranch 137, at pp. 165, 166. 
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is permissible even though public interests are at stake. In every 
such case the State. has in reality been sued. The individual officer 
is before. the court for his· own. wrong-doing, his usurpation of 
power, and disobedience of private or public law. But the relief 
is against him as an agent of the State and the decision of the court 
so affects the State that it cannot be said not to be a party to the 
action. The procedure is not dangerous, for violation of a con-
stitutional guarantee is essential. Moreover, public policy demands 
dficiency and justice from administrative officers. 
In Ex parle Young/ the vigorous logic of Mr. Justice lIAiu,AN 
i:~cognizes the State as a party: "How else can the State be for-
bidden by judicial process . to bring actions in its name, except by 
constraining the conduct of its officers, its attorneys, and its agents? 
And if all such officers, attorneys, and agents are personally sub-
jected to the process of th~ court, so as to forbid their acting in 
their behalf, how can it be said ·that the State itself is not subjected 
to the jurisdiction of the court as an actual and real defendant?" 
'The learned Justice MA't'l'HEWS considered such an action as one 
against the individual officer as a wrongdoer:11 "In the discussion 
of such questions, the distinction bet:Ween the government of a State 
and the State itself is important and should be observed. In common 
speech and common apprehension they are usually regarded as iden-
tical ;.and as ordinarily the acts of the government are-the acts of the 
State, because within the limits of its delegation of power, the gov-
ernment of the State is generally confounded with the State itself, 
and often the former is meant when the latttr is mentioned. The. State 
itself is an ideal person, intangible, invisible, immutable. The govern-
ment is an agent, and, within the sphere of f,ts agency, a perfect 
representative; but outside of that, it is a lawless usurpation. The 
Constitution of the State is the limit of the authority of its govern-
ment, and both govern.ment and State are subject to the supremacy 
of the Constitution of the United States, and of the laws made in 
pursuance thereof. * * * That which, therefore, . is unlawful· be-
cause made so by the. supreme law, the Constitution of the United 
States, is not the word or deed of the State, but is the mere wrong 
and trespass· of those individual persons who falsely speak and act 
in its name." 
Might it not logically be said that there are three parties to an 
action against State officers-the aggrieved citizen, the wrongdomg 
agent, and the State ·by its court? The State by its judge is en-
forcing that law which the other agent of the State has disobeyed. 
4 209 U. S. 123, at p. 188. 
•Poindexter v. Greenhow, n4 U. S. 270, at pp. 290, 291. 
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Its power to compel obedience depends upon the division of powers 
in the Constitution. If the case or the relief asked is of a political 
character, the citizen has chosen the wrong tribunal. He must re-
sort to Public Opinion. If the case or relief desired is judicial, the 
court has the clear power to guarantee to him his constitutional 
rights. The Eleventh Amendment is applicable to the first; the 
Fourteenth, if the case be within its provisions, to the second. 
A review of the important decisions of the United States Su- . 
preme Court upon the Eleventh Amendment would seem to indi-
cate that it is not applicable to cases involving the violation of a 
citizen's civil rights by an officer. There are several classes of cases 
in which a citizen has bee,n protected from a denial of constitutional 
rights by public agents. 
This protection has been decreed where state officers have de-
prived a citizen of his· liberty by an unlawful detention in custody. 
Here the writ of habeas corpus has been utilized to restore liberty 
to the prisoner. An example is Ex parte Royall :8 "That the peti-
tioner is held under the authority of a State cannot affect the ques-
tion of the power or jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to inquire 
into the cause of his commitment, and to discharge him if he is 
restrained of his lfberty in violation of the Constitution." 
In another class of cases public agents have refused to surrender 
to a citizen property in their possession to which he claims title. 
Osborn v. Bank,7 United States v. Lee,8 and Tindal v. Wesley,9 
represent this type. The case cited at the head of this article most 
resembles these. The property of which the contractor has been 
deprived cannot be recovered because of its merger with other im-
movable property. Equitable relief, however, can be given against 
the administrative officers and the fund appropriated for the pay-
ment of such claims. 'l'he distinction between the case at hand and 
those cited is technical. 
In each of these three cases it should be noted. that the court 
ordered restitution of his property to the complainant citizen. · The 
State by its officers was in possession of the property in each case 
and asserted title. 'l'hese decisions certainly establish the principle 
that mere possession of property by public officers and assertion 
of a right to retain possession is not an objection to an action against 
the public agents. State officers are sutbject to judicial process even 
though the relief granted concerns the title of a State to property 
in its possession . 
• 117 u. s. 241. 
1 9 Wheaton 738 • 
• 106 u. s. 196 • 
• 167 u. s. 204-
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·Mr. Justice-MILLER in the Lee case replied to the objection of the 
Eleventh Amendment as follows :10 
"Looking at the question upon principle, and apart from the au-
thority of adjudged cases, we think it is still clearer that this branch 
of the defense cannot be maintained. It seems to be opposed to 
all the principles upon which the rights of the citizen, when brought 
. info collision with the acts of the government, must be determined. 
In such cases there is no safety for the citizen, except in the pro-
tection of the judicial tribunals, for rights which have been invaded 
by the officers of the government professing to act in its name." 
"The defense stands here solely upon the absolute immunity 
from judicial inquiry of every one who asserts authority from the 
executive ·branch of the government, however clear· it may be made 
that the executive possessed no such power. Not only no such 
p()wer is given, but it is absolutely prohibited both to the executive 
and the legislative, to deprive any one of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law, or to take private property without just 
compensation." 
·The recent cases in which the Fourteenth Amendment has been 
declared a limitation on the State'_s immunity from suit are those 
involving the regulation of rates. Mr. Justice Hor.MES declared in 
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line:n "We may add that when the rate 
is fixed, a bill against the commission to restrain the members from 
enforcing it will not be bad as an attempt to enjoin legislation or 
as a suit against a State, and will be the proper form of remedy." 
Other cases are "Reagan v. Far.mers' Loan and Trust Co.,12 Smyth 
v. Ames,18 Prout v. Starr,1'' and Ex parte Y oung.15 All of these 
adjudications indicate the power of a court ·of equity to protect 
the constitutional rights of a citizen against governmental agencies. 
Granted a right to protection and a jurisdiction over the wrong-
·doers, a court can clearly grant any relief which its arsenal contains. 
The cases in which Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution and 
the Eleventh Amendment have .clashed illustrate a distinction be-
tween clear civil rights of a citizen and other less certain rights 
involving a political element not protected by constitutional guar-
antees. They can only be reconciled by MARSHALL'S classification 
of civil and political acts cited ante. 
SI 106 U, S. 196', at pp. 218-19, 2:20. 
U 2II U. S. 2IO, 
22 154 U. 5. 362 • 
.. 16g u. s. 466. 
.. 188 u. s. 537· 
:II 209 u. s. 123-
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In Davis v. Gray, 16 the court said: "When a State becomes a 
party to a contract, as in the case before us, the same rules of law 
are applied to her as to private persons under like circumstances. 
When she and her representatives are properly ·brought into the 
forum of litigation, neither she nor th.ey can assert ·any right or 
immunity as incident to her political sovereignty." 
Poindexter v. Greenhow,17 recognizes the same doctrine: "And 
how else can these principles of individual liberty and right •be 
maintained, if, when violated the judicial tribunals ~re forbidden 
to visit penalties upon individual off enders, who are the instru-
ments of wrong, whenever they interpose the shield of the State? 
The doctrine is not to be tolerated." 
"'The mandate. of the State affords no justification for the in-
vasion of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States; 
otherwise that constitution would not be the supreme law of. the 
land." . 
Allen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.,18 reiterates the doctrine: 
"Where the rights in jeopardy are those of private citizens and 
are of those classes which the Constitution of the United States 
either c0nfers or has taken under its protection, and no adequate 
remedy for their enforcement is provided by the forms and pro-
ceedings purely· legal, the same necessity invokes and justifies, in 
cases in which its remedies can be applied, that jurisdiction in equity 
vested by the Constitution of the United States, and which cannot 
be affected by the legislation of the States." 
Public officers in all of these cases were restrained from doing 
acts which violated contracts to which the State was a party. Con-
stitutional guarantees were violated and public officers were repri-
manded for the violation. The Eleventh Amendment was ignored 
and properly ignored. 
There is another kind of contract which the Supreme Court has 
refused to_ enforce against the objection of the State's immunity. 
from suit. It is found in Louisiana v. Jumel,19 Hagood v. South-
em,20 and In re Ayers.21 In each of these controversies a right was 
recognized in the State superior to an individual's appeal for the 
protection of his property. They are an expression of the political 
power of a State to ignore the claims of some particular class of 
citizens when the welfare of the entire citizenship is concerned. On 
u 16 Wall. 203, at p. 232. 
1r II4 U. S. 270, at pp. 29r, 292. 
Un4 U. S. 3n, at pp. 316, 317. 
11 107 U. S. 7n. 
" 117 u. s. 52. 
= 123 u. s. 443. 
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questions of policy peculiarly within the province of the faw-making 
body, its commands uttered in the form of laws are an expression 
of the will of the sovereign electorate binding on the courts them-· 
selves. 'I'he only question ·before the court is the nature of the act-
legislative and political or civil and judicial. 
The following quotation from Louisiana v. Juniel22 illustrates the 
thought: 
"The question, then, is whether the contract can be enforced, not:. 
withstanding the Constitution, by coercing the agents and officers 
of the State, whose aut4ority ·has been withdrawn in violation of the 
~~mtract, without the State itself in its political capacity being a 
party to the proceedings. 
"The relief asked will require the officers against whom the pro-
cess is issued to act contrary to the positive orders of the supreme 
political power of the State, whose creatures they are, and to which 
they are ultimately responsible in law for what they do. They must 
use the public money in the treasury and under their official control 
in o:r,ie way, when the supreme power has directed them to use it in 
another, and they must raise more money by taxation when the same 
power has declared that it shall not be done." 
-Mr. Justice MAT'tHEws in the Hagood case decided that there was 
no ~reach of c.ontract and it was not a case where "personal and 
property rights" had been violated by public officers. The same 
judge in the Ayers case said that no contract had been violated, the 
subject matter was not within the jurisdiction of the court, and the 
remedy on this kind of a contract was not protected. 
Viewed ·from the standpoint of public rescission the contract of 
In re Ayers is the same kind of a contract as that of the following 
cases: Beer Co. v. Massachusetts,23 Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,2" 
Stone v. Mississippi;25 Illinois R. R. v. Illinois.26 It is a property 
right subject to restriction by an exercise of sovereignty b)' gov-
ernmental agencies under mandates from the elecforate. The grant 
of the privilege is repeatable whenever the same public interest that 
called it forth demands its repeal. Sovereignty cannot be bargained 
away to one member or one group of the State. 
The Eleventh Amendment may be said to be an expression of 
sovereignty's immunity from judicial control. In these United 
States a sovereign electorate rather than a sovereign King utters 
the command. When that command has crystallized into law, no 
,. Io7 U. S. 7n, at p. 72I. 
,. 97 u. s. 25 • 
.. 97 u. s. 659. 
:II IOI U. 5. 79• 
• I46 u. s. 387. 
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Supreme Court has a power of nullification, even though it force a 
reorganization of society, or introduce a new and different concep-
tion of private right. No individual or group in a democracy has 
a constitutional right to the perpetuity of any prevailing social, po-
litical, or economic theory. Public rights are greater than private 
rights. Nor is this a new doctrine. It is the right of political 
revolution proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence and made 
possible through peaceful and legal channels by the recognition in 
the Federal Constitution of rule by the numerical majority. 
An attempt has been made in this article to apply fundamental 
principles of political and constitutional theory to conflicting clau~es 
of our Constitution. The immunity of a State from suit and its 
officers from court process set up ·by the Attorney General in the 
case cited cannot be said .to be the correct theory of the Ametjcan 
system of government. In some cases constitutional guarantees 
demand that a citizen be allowed court process against public officers 
even though the State in its organic capacity is affected thereby • 
. In other cases, such relief would deny to the American people the 
right of political revolution through legal channels, leaving sovereign 
powers in the hands of a few monarchs of the bench. . 
· The Fourteenth Amendment may be said to be applicabte to all 
cases where public officers through ignorance or malice deny to a 
citizen his right to life, liberty, ·or property. The Eleventh Amend-
ment properly covers all cases involving political questions, espe-
cially conflicts between public and private right. In the words of 
MoN'tSSQU!EU: "There is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not 
separated from the legislative and executive." 
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